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Abstract 
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard 
problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these 
markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation 
powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by 
increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a 
considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price 
rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from 
social preferences. Thus, in markets characterized by moral hazard, reputational incentives 
unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets 
more responsive to supply and demand shocks.  
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Severe moral hazard problems are pervasive in many labour, credit, and goods markets. 
Reputational incentives are likely to play an important role in such markets (MacLeod 2007) 
but empirical evidence on the role of reputation is still scarce. This paper empirically assesses 
the impact of reputational incentives on contract enforcement, the terms of trade, and the 
structure of interactions between contracting partners in a competitive environment with 
severe moral hazard problems. Our examination starts from a body of evidence indicating that 
heterogeneous preferences for fairness, equity, social image concerns, efficiency, or 
reciprocity generally have a non-negligible impact on behaviour in such environments.1 For 
convenience, we summarize these different non-pecuniary motives under the term 
“reciprocity” because these motives typically imply some kind of “reciprocal behaviour” in 
the principal-agent contexts we study. The evidence shows that reciprocity contributes to the 
enforcement of contracts in moral hazard situations but a considerable gap typically remains 
between the first best performance levels and the performance levels enforced by reciprocity. 
The efficiency enhancing effects of reciprocity on contract enforcement come at a cost, 
however – the payment of non-competitive rents to the agents and an extremely high degree 
of price stickiness in response to supply and demand shocks.  
It is natural to ask how reputation formation affects the interactions between principals 
and agents because many relevant situations involve repeated interactions or situations where 
principals acquire information about agents' past behaviour. In fact, repeated interactions are 
ubiquitous in labour, credit, and goods markets. In view of the existence of a heterogeneous 
population of reciprocal and selfish individuals, reputational incentives inevitably interact 
with reciprocity in these environments. Therefore, focusing on the question how reciprocity 
and reputation interact in the enforcement of contracts is indispensable in understanding the 
impact of reputational incentives because reciprocal individuals' behaviour may generate 
strong reputation incentives for the selfish individuals to meet their contractual obligations.  
Our main insights can be summarized as follows. Reputation formation strongly 
amplifies the positive effect of reciprocity on contract efficiency. The intuitive reason behind 
this finding is that the opportunity for reputation formation implies that selfish agents also 
have an incentive to behave as if they were reciprocal. By mimicking reciprocal behaviour, 
selfish agents make the principal believe that they are (at least potentially) reciprocal. Such a 
reputation is valuable for selfish agents because the principal only pays non-competitive rents 
                                                 
1 The interested reader may consult reviews such as Fehr and Fischbacher (2002), chapter 3 of Camerer (2003) 
or the recent survey of Fehr, Goette and Zehnder (2008).  
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to agents who have not yet been identified as selfish. As a consequence, reputational 
incentives imply that a relatively small fraction of reciprocal agents suffices to generate large 
efficiency gains. In fact, reputation effects can be sufficiently strong to sustain very high 
levels of efficiency, even when reciprocal behaviour alone cannot prevent a market collapse. 
While reputation formation enhances efficiency, it also fundamentally alters the nature 
of interactions in competitive markets with moral hazard. The absence of third party 
enforcement of contracts give rise to a strong bilateralisation of trades, that is, a large share of 
all trades takes place in long-term relations between trading partners in which reciprocity and 
reputation sustain high performance levels. In fact, we can show that bilateral relations prevail 
even when public information about agents’ past behaviour would provide adequate 
information for sustaining reputation incentives outside of such relations.  
One might conjecture that the strong bilateralisation of market interactions could 
foster rent-sharing and the stickiness of prices with regard to supply and demand shocks 
because pairs of successfully cooperating traders might develop social ties that render fairness 
concerns more prominent. However, we find the opposite to be true. Reputational incentives 
lead to a substantial reduction in price stickiness relative to a situation in which only 
reciprocity can enforce contracts. This finding enables us to identify a main source for sticky 
prices, namely the absence of third party contract enforcement and the resulting reliance on 
reciprocity as a contact enforcement device. Reputational incentives mitigate this price 
stickiness, but they do not remove it completely: a substantial amount of price stickiness 
remains even in the presence of reputational incentives.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 1 provides a short review 
of laboratory and field evidence on reciprocity as a contract enforcement device in one-shot 
interactions. Section 2 documents how reputation formation amplifies the positive impact of 
reciprocity on contract efficiency and how it affects market interactions in a thorough way. 
Section 3 provides new evidence indicating that reputation significantly mitigates the price 
rigidity that is generated by the absence of third party enforcement of contracts. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
 
1. Reciprocity, contract enforcement and price rigidity 
Recognizing how moral hazard problems affect the principals’ and the agents’ behaviour 
when neither explicit nor implicit (i.e., reputational) incentives are present is necessary for 
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understanding the effects of reputation and how it interacts with reciprocity. Under these 
circumstances, reciprocity is the only remaining contract enforcement device. We thus 
provide a short review of the impact of reciprocity on contract enforcement and price rigidity, 
which sets the stage for studying the impact of reputation.2  
A convenient tool for studying the impact of social preferences on contract 
enforcement and wage/price rigidity is the gift-exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 
1993). This game models a one-shot transaction in which explicit incentives are absent and 
the agent’s performance (i.e. effort or product quality) is not legally enforceable. The most 
natural interpretations of this game are employment contracts in which the worker’s effort is 
not contractible, or sales contracts for experience goods, when inspection cannot determine 
quality. The structure of the game is as follows: The principal suggests a contract to the agent, 
specifying a fixed payment and a requested performance level. While the payment to the 
agent is enforceable, the agent’s performance is not. If the agent rejects the contract offer, he 
receives an outside option. If he accepts, he can choose his performance level independent of 
the requested level; higher performance generates higher revenues for the principal but also 
higher costs for the agent. The principal’s profit is equal to the revenue generated by the 
agent’s performance minus the fixed payment. The agent’s payoff, in turn, is calculated as the 
fixed payment minus the cost of his performance. The parameters of the cost and revenue 
function are usually chosen in such a way that the efficient outcome is achieved when the 
agent chooses the maximum performance level. 
If all players were purely self-interested, a very inefficient outcome would result in 
this game. Since higher levels of performance are associated with higher costs, selfish agents 
are never willing to provide more than the minimum performance level. Rational principals 
anticipate this behaviour and offer a payment that compensates the worker for his outside-
option and the cost of the minimum performance level. However, if there is a sufficiently 
large share of reciprocal agents who are willing to reward high fixed payments with high 
performance, it may be profitable for the principal to pay the agent a rent. 
A large number of laboratory studies report evidence from one-shot gift-exchange 
experiments in which reputation formation cannot play a role (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and 
Riedl 1993; Fehr and Falk 1999; Gaechter and Falk 2002; Hannan, Kagel and Moser 2002; 
Charness 2004; Charness, Frechette and Kagel 2004; Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004; List 2006; 
Englmaier and Leider 2008). The results of these papers can be summarized as follows: A 
                                                 
2 Readers familiar with this literature may skip this section.  
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non-negligible share of agents chooses non-minimal performance levels when offered a 
payment that gives them a rent. Moreover, these reciprocal agents typically reward higher 
payments with higher performance. There are also many agents, however, who choose the 
minimal performance irrespective of the offered payment. On average, principals make 
payments that provide agents with a positive rent leading to wage rigidity relative to the 
competitive wage level. However, due to the substantial share of selfish agents, many 
principals refrain from payments high enough to induce maximum performance. As a 
consequence, average performance is usually significantly higher than the minimum, but still 
substantially lower than the efficient level.3 
The gap between the efficient effort level and the actual effort provided in a simple 
gift exchange, in which only the agent can reciprocate, can be reduced if the principal is also 
given an opportunity to reciprocate (Fehr, Gaechter and Kirchsteiger 1997; Fehr, Klein and 
Schmidt 2007). For example, if the principal can reward or punish the agent ex post in a one-
shot game, a significant increase in the effort level relative to the effort in a simple gift 
exchange can be achieved. This increase stems from the fact that reciprocal principals provide 
an incentive for selfish agents to provide non-minimal performance. However, even if the 
principal can reciprocate, the agents’ average effort is typically still far from the first best 
level.4  
While laboratory experiments have the great advantage of providing the researcher 
with a high degree of control, it is possible that findings identified in laboratory settings may 
not carry over to field environments. Fortunately, several researchers addressed this question 
with field experiments implementing gift exchange situations in natural environments. In 
order to study gift-exchange in the field, experimenters exogenously manipulated the fixed 
wage paid to workers in natural work environments with a one-shot character. The workers in 
these experiments perform tasks like data entry (Gneezy and List, 2006; Kube, Marechal and 
Puppe 2007; Englmaier and Leider, 2008), stuffing envelopes (Al-Ubaydli, Andersen, Gneezy 
and List 2007), newspaper promotion (Cohn, Fehr and Goette 2007) and planting trees 
(Bellemare and Shearer, 2007). In general, these studies confirm the existence of reciprocal 
responses in the field. If the wage is cut relative to the promised or expected payment, the 
                                                 
3 An illustrative example is the one-shot condition in Brown, Falk and Fehr. (2004), where the performance 
levels could be chosen on a scale from 1 to 10. While 10 would be the efficient level, the average performance 
ends up at a level of 3.3.  
4 In Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2007), for example, the principals have the option of paying a bonus ex post, that 
is, after observing the agents’ effort. The first best effort level is 10 (on a scale from 1 to 10) but the agents’ 
average effort is 5.2.  
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workers’ output decreases substantially (Kube et al. 2007), indicating the relevance of 
negative reciprocity in the field. Positive effects of wage increases on workers’ performance 
are also present in field settings. However, the average impact of a pure wage increase on 
effort has been small in several of the above mentioned studies (see Fehr, Goette and Zehnder 
2008 for a more detailed discussion). One reason why in several field studies the effect of 
wage increases is small may be that the fairness increasing effect of a wage increase is not 
transparent: workers are simply paid a higher wage relative to what they were told when 
hired, but no explanation is given for the increase.5 The gift exchange hypothesis predicts that 
wage variations that are associated with fairness or kindness variations will lead to variations 
in performance; if wage variations do not affect workers’ fairness or kindness perceptions, no 
performance effect is predicted. Support for this view comes from Cohn, Fehr and Goette 
(2007) and Kube, Marechal and Puppe (2008). Cohn et al. (2007) show that only those 
workers who view the previous wage as unfairly low respond significantly positive with their 
effort to a wage increase, while workers who perceived the previous wage as fair do not 
increase their effort level. Kube et al. (2008) show that workers who receive a non-monetary 
gift in gift wrap paper, which renders the kindness of the gift salient, exhibit a large effort 
increase, while a surprise wage increase by the amount of the value of the gift leads only to a 
small effort increase.  
Taken together, the findings of laboratory and field experiments provide empirical 
support for the efficiency enhancing effect of reciprocity in situations of contractual 
incompleteness where principals face a moral hazard problem. However, in simple gift 
exchanges, in which only agents have a chance to reciprocate, the effects of monetary wage 
gifts on efficiency are not overwhelming. Moreover, this efficiency enhancing effect is 
associated with considerable wage rigidity, i.e., rent payments to the workers. The question 
then is how reputational incentives affect efficiency, prices, and trading patterns in an 
environment characterized by moral hazard that is already partially solved by reciprocal 
interactions between principals and agents.  
 
                                                 
5 Therefore, employees may come up with many different interpretations for why they are paid more than 
expected. Some may believe that the employers’ ability to pay is high enough. Others may believe that the initial 
wage promise was mistakenly low. Still others’ may self-servingly attribute the wage increase as a reward for 
their ability. In all these cases, workers have no reason to believe that the wage increase constitutes a kind act 
and, therefore, the gift exchange hypothesis does not predict that effort should rise in these cases. 
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2. Reputation – a Powerful Amplifier of the Efficiency Enhancing Effect of Reciprocity 
In real-world markets with moral hazard, market participants often have the opportunity to 
transact repeatedly. If the same principals and agents interact repeatedly or if the principal has 
information about the agent’s behaviour in previous transactions with other principals, the 
principal can condition the current contract terms on the agent’s past behaviour. This may 
motivate the agent to perform, because if he satisfies the principal today, his future contract 
terms are more attractive. There is a large theoretical literature showing that these reputational 
forces may solve moral hazard problems even if all traders are completely selfish (see Klein 
Crawford and Alchian 1978 and Klein and Leffler 1981 for early discussions of this problem; 
later papers include Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bull 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, 
1998; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994, 2002).  
However, we already know from dozens of laboratory experiments and from the 
recent wave of field experiments that not all agents are selfish. Thus, an empirical assessment 
of reputation incentives must take possible interactions between reciprocity and reputation 
into account. One way to study these interactions is to implement laboratory games with a 
finite time horizon. In some cases, a finite time horizon is an empirically realistic 
approximation of real world phenomena. For example, there is a mandatory retirement age in 
many countries, making the end of one’s employment relation is perfectly foreseeable. 
However, we use finitely repeated games in our context mainly as a work horse for studying 
interactions between reciprocal and selfish individuals because a commonly known final 
period enables us to identify the selfish individuals: selfish individuals will never provide 
non-minimal performance levels in the final period.  
The seminal paper by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) shows that the 
mere belief in the existence of reciprocal players may sustain cooperative play for a large 
number of periods in a finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game. Their argument begs the 
question where such a belief should come from. However, this becomes obvious in view of 
the strong evidence for the existence of reciprocal individuals. In the presence of reciprocal 
agents, selfish agents may have incentives to provide high performance if their principal treats 
them kindly. The reason is that such behaviour makes the principal believe that these agents 
are (at least potentially) reciprocal. Such a reputation is valuable for selfish agents because 
finite repetition implies that the principal only makes attractive offers to agents who have not 
yet been identified as selfish. This is due to the principal’s anticipation that selfish agents will 
always shirk in the final period. By backward induction, this expectation unravels all 
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incentives to make kind offers in any period of the interaction. The presence of a share of 
reciprocal agents may motivate the principal to make a generous offer to an agent of unknown 
type even in the last period. If principals are willing to make generous offers, this implies that 
workers can earn rents. However, selfish agents need to hide their type and imitate the 
behaviour of reciprocal agents in order to have access to these rents. Since not only the truly 
reciprocal agents, but the selfish ones as well, are willing to perform in response to generous 
offers in non-final periods, generous offers are then even more attractive to principals. In the 
following we show that reputational incentives indeed discipline the selfish types among the 
agents. Consequently, these incentives greatly increase the gains from trade and the frequency 
of trading between principals and agents in markets with moral hazard.  
 
2.1. Reputation in Relational Contracts 
Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) examine gift-exchange in a laboratory market in which the 
parties can choose their trading partners. There are 7 principals and 10 agents. Each market 
participant can conclude a maximum of one contract per period so that there is an excess 
supply of agents. The matching between principals and agents takes place in a one-sided 
continuous posted-offer auction. Principals can make as many contract offers as they wish 
during a period, stipulating their payment and the desired performance. Moreover, principals 
can choose whether to make the contract offer public, in which case all market participants 
see the offer, and any agent can accept. Alternatively, a contract offer can be made privately 
to one agent, who is the only person who can see and accept the offer. After an agent has 
accepted a contract offer, he chooses his performance. The experiment lasts 15 periods, which 
is common knowledge among participants. 
The main condition in this experiment is the incomplete contracts with fixed identities 
(ICF) treatment. In this treatment, contracts are not third-party enforceable, i.e. the agent can 
freely choose his performance, irrespective of the principal’s requests in his contract offer. 
Also, all principals and agents have fixed identification numbers for the whole duration of the 
experiment. This feature enables principals and agents to engage in long-term relationships. 
Moreover, it allows principals within these relationships to condition their contract offers on 
the agent's past behaviour, so that reputation effects can emerge endogenously.  
The authors compare the outcome of this main treatment to two control treatments. In 
the incomplete contracts with random identities (ICR) treatment, everything is identical to the 
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ICF except that subjects’ identification numbers are randomly reassigned in every period. 
Thus, reputation formation and relational contracting is ruled out in this treatment, and 
reciprocity is the sole contract enforcement device. The second control treatment is the 
complete contracts (C) treatment in which contracts are third-party enforceable: agents must 
provide the performance desired by the principal in the accepted contract in this treatment and 
identification numbers of market participants are fixed throughout the experiment, so that 
long-term relationships are possible but not necessary to enforce performance.  
Figure 1A shows that reputation opportunities cause a substantial increase in the 
average performance level. This effect is indicated by the large performance difference 
between the ICF and the ICR. In addition, the reputation effect is already significant in 
periods 1 and 2, consistent with the view that many subjects immediately understand the logic 
of reputational incentives. Figure 1B shows that reputational incentives indeed discipline 
selfish subjects. This figure shows each agent’s average performance in periods 1-14 and in 
period 15. The selfish individuals chose the minimal performance of 1 in period 15, but many 
of them chose rather high performance levels in the non-final periods, indicating the 
disciplining effect of reputational incentives. In contrast, the reciprocal subjects also chose 
high performance levels in the final period. In fact, their final period performance was 
sufficiently high to render the payment of rents in this period profitable for the agents.  
 
Figure 1A and 1B here 
 
The principals disciplined the agents in the non-final periods by practicing a contingent 
renewal policy: If an agent provided high performance in period t, the principal offered him a 
new contract in t+1. This contract was characterized by a high payment that implied a 
substantial rent for the agent. If an agent performed poorly, the principal offered him, with a 
very high probability, no contract at all in t+1. In turn, many agents provided high 
performance as long as principals offered them contracts which involved substantial rents. 
The principals’ contingent renewal policy led to a considerable bilateralisation of market 
interactions because the principals frequently made private offers to their incumbents. 44% of 
the offers in the ICF are private offers to the incumbent agent, while this only occurs in 10% 
of the cases in the C treatment, in which contract enforcement is exogenous. The differences 
in actual trades (accepted offers) are even more striking. 52% of actual trades in the ICF 
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treatment are renewed contracts with the last-period agent. In contrast, only 8% of trades in 
the C treatment are contract renewals and 76% of the trades are initiated by public offers. 
Thus, the principals' contingent renewal policy in the ICF together with the associated 
performance increase led to long-term relations. Figure 1C documents this by showing the 
cumulative share of trades that took place in relationships of various lengths. For example, 
while 90% of all trades in the C treatment took place in one-shot or two-shot interactions, 
51% of all trades in the ICF occurred in relationships that lasted 4 or more periods.  
 
2.2. Public Reputation in Relational Contracts 
The above evidence suggests that the provision of reputational incentives may fundamentally 
alter the nature of market interactions. If third parties enforce contracts, one-shot interactions 
prevail and incumbent workers receive no special treatment, whereas information about past 
behaviour becomes important if a moral hazard problem exists, thus transforming competitive 
markets into bilateral trading islands. There is indeed a considerable body of field evidence 
for the prevalence of repeated bilateral interactions in many markets. Important examples are 
long-term employment relationships (Hall 1982; Auer and Cazes, 2000), lending relationships 
between banks and small businesses (Berger and Udell 1995), long-term exchange 
relationships between providers and consumers of experience goods (Kollock 1994). 
Unfortunately, however, the field evidence does not reveal whether these repeated interactions 
emerge due to potential moral hazard and the provision of reputational incentives. The 
problem is that distinguishing reputational incentive effects from other reasons for repeated 
interaction, such as transaction costs of switching or insurance considerations (Azariadis 
1975), is very difficult in the available field data. The laboratory experiments solve this 
problem, thus providing evidence that contracting problems cause repeated bilateral trading.  
However, the bilateralisation of market interactions observed in Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004) may be a consequence of the fact that the agents could only acquire reputation in a 
bilateral interaction with a principal. Principals in this experiment only observed "their" 
agents' past performance, but not that of the other agents in the market, rendering the 
acquisition of a public reputation impossible. While public reputation plays little or no role at 
all in many labour and service markets, there are also markets where agents can acquire a 
public reputation. Public reputation mechanisms may be institutionalized – such as credit 
bureaus in credit markets – or they may arise informally – such as reference letters in the 
labour market. The question therefore arises whether the addition of public reputation 
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removes or diminishes the bilateralisation of market interactions. Falk, Fehr and Zehnder 
(2004) addressed this question by adding a public reputation formation opportunity to the ICF 
treatment described above. All principals could observe all past wage and effort levels of all 
agents in the market in this modified ICF treatment. The authors observe that public 
reputation opportunities indeed reduce the bilateralisation of the market somewhat because 
the percentage of trades that takes place in long-term relations is significantly higher in the 
ICF than in the treatment with public reputation. However, public reputation has a 
surprisingly small effect because a large number of trades still take place in bilateral, long-
term relations. This fact becomes transparent in Figure 1C if one compares the C treatment 
with the modified ICF treatment with public reputation. While roughly 40% of all trades in 
the public reputation treatment take place in relationships lasting 4 or more periods, almost all 
interactions in the C treatment occur in one or two-shot interactions. Thus, despite the fact 
that public reputation somewhat crowds out relational contracting, the principals still rely on 
contingent contract renewal of relational contracts as a discipline device to a large extent.  
The addition of public reputation to the ICF also leads to an increase in performance, 
bringing it closer to its efficient level. In fact, the agents’ average performance for an 
extended number of periods (period 7-13) is roughly 9 (on a scale between 1-10), only one 
unit below the efficient level. In particular, public reputation increases performance levels in 
case of lower wage offers, rendering the principal less dependent on reciprocity as a contract 
enforcement device.6  
 
2.3. Competition and Relational Contracts 
The threat of firing in case of low performance disciplines selfish agents in Brown, Falk and 
Fehr (2004); those who are fired face the risk of unemployment due to the excess supply of 
agents. What happens, however, if there is no risk of unemployment because there is an 
excess demand for agents? Are relational contracts that enforce high performance still 
possible in this environment, and if so, what are the terms of these contracts? In particular, 
how can selfish agents be disciplined if finding another principal who hires them is easy?  
                                                 
6 Brown and Zehnder (2007) examine the impact of institutionalised information sharing between lenders on the 
behaviour of borrowers in the credit market. They find that in the absence of the possibility for repeated 
interaction, information sharing between lenders generates substantial reputation incentives for selfish borrowers 
to repay loans. When relationship formation is possible, they confirm the findings of Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004) and Falk, Fehr and Zehnder (2004). Bilateral relationships themselves motivate repayment, so that 
information sharing has little additional impact on borrower behaviour. Public information sharing also slightly 
reduces the formation of bilateral long-term relationships. 
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Models of labour and credit markets (Carmichael, 1984, MacLeod and Malcomson 
1998, Boot and Thakor 1994) show that relational contracts can, in principle, sustain high 
performance by agents even when these are in high demand. In order to do so, however, 
incumbent principals must offer contracts which involve quasi-rents for agents: Once the 
agents are in a relationship with a principal, the future value of this relationship must be 
higher than potential value of switching to an "outside" principal.  
In a recent paper, Brown, Falk and Fehr (2008) examine the principals’ performance 
enforcement strategies when there is strong competition for agents’ services. They modify 
their experiment from 2004 by implementing an excess demand for agents (10 principals and 
7 agents). In the following we call this the high-demand market, and refer to their 2004 
experiment as the low-demand market. The results of Brown et al. (2008) show that 
principals’ contract offers also provide reputational incentives for selfish players when there 
is an excess demand for agents. Those agents who provide high effort receive a wage offer in 
the next period from their incumbant principal which exceeds the wages they could get from 
outside principals in the market. In this way, principals in the high-demand market reward 
high performance. As a result, the agents' mean performance in the ICF treatment is 
significantly higher than in the ICR treatment of the high-demand market (see Figure 2).  
However, the excess demand for agents leads to a lower incidence of long-term 
relations. For example, relationships exceeding 6 periods are substantially less frequent in the 
market with high-demand (24% of all trades) than in the market with low-demand (45% of all 
trades). This suggests that strong competition for agents makes sustaining long-term relations 
more difficult, as agents are more likely to abandon their incumbent principal. This conjecture 
is confirmed by comparing the break-up of relationships in the ICF treatment under both 
market conditions. In the market with a high-demand, principals are equally likely to make a 
renewed contract offer to their last-period agent as in the market with an excess supply of 
agents (80%). However, while agents only reject 2% of these offers in the market with low-
demand, 28% were rejected in the market with high-demand.  
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Does the lower frequency of long-term relations in the market with high-demand reduce 
agents’ performance relative to the market with low-demand? Surprisingly, it does not. The 
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agents’ mean performance by period evolves almost identically under both market conditions 
(compare ICF high with ICF low in Figure 2), causing almost the same average performance 
under high-demand (6.7) as under low-demand (6.9). The identical performance in the two 
conditions, despite a lower incidence of long-term relations in the high-demand condition, is 
somewhat puzzling. There are two explanations for this finding: First, due to stronger 
competition for agents, wages are substantially higher under high-demand than under low-
demand which induces higher performance by reciprocal agents (see section 3 for a detailed 
discussion of wages in the high-demand and low-demand conditions). Thus in the market with 
high-demand, reciprocity in combination with higher wages may play a larger role in 
performance provision. Support for the larger role of reciprocity under high-demand is 
provided in Figure 2, which shows that mean performance is substantially higher in the high-
demand condition of the ICR than in the low-demand condition of the ICR. Second, the 
authors find that in the high-demand market reputational incentives are still strong in many 
relationships which break off early. As discussed above, many relationships in the high 
demand market are broken off by the agents after they have performed well and received a 
renewed contract offer. This suggests that agents provide a high level of effort for their 
current principal because the expected payments from "outside" principals are lower than 
those of their current one. However, once in a while though, outside principals make high 
wage offers which lure agents away from their current relationship. Indeed, the authors find 
that in the majority of cases (74%) in which relationships are broken off by the agent, the 
agent had received an outside offer which was at least as high as that of his current principal. 
Since agents sometimes terminate ongoing high performance relations after the arrival of a 
high outside offer in the high-demand treatment, average performance in short and medium 
term relations is substantially higher than in the low demand treatment where relationships are 
mostly broken off by unsatisfied principals  
 
2.4. Reputation Effects when Reciprocity Alone Fails 
In the previous subsections, we reported evidence showing that reputation formation 
opportunities amplify the impact of reciprocity and substantially increase agents’ performance 
levels. However, two important features facilitate contract enforcement in the previously 
reported experiments. First, the parameters of the experiments were chosen in such a way that 
the typically prevailing share of reciprocal subjects (40-60%) renders trading in a one-shot 
environment viable. Thus, almost all feasible trades took place even in the absence of any 
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reputational incentives, i.e., non-minimal performance levels could be attributed to reciprocity 
alone. This raises the question of the effects of reputational incentives when reciprocity alone 
is too weak to maintain trading. Second, the principals in the previous subsections had perfect 
information about the incumbent agents’ past effort in the relationship. Thus, if an agent 
provided low effort, there was no ambiguity in interpreting this event: the agent did not want 
to provide a higher effort, providing a good signal about the agents’ type. However, random 
exogenous events may, in reality, be responsible for a low output. If the principal can only 
directly observe an agent's output, but not his effort per se, a low output ceases to be a precise 
indicator of low effort. A low output may then indicate bad luck or a low effort; this 
ambiguity may mitigate the power of contingent renewal policies because future rewards can 
only be made contingent on a random output measure.  
In theory, reputational equilibria with high performance can also be sustained if 
principals cannot observe the agent’s effort perfectly and reciprocity alone fails to enable 
trade (e.g., Kreps and Wilson 1982; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson 1982; Camerer and 
Weigelt 1988; Diamond 1989, Brown and Zehnder 2007, Fehr and Zehnder 2008). However, 
little is known empirically about the impact of reputational incentives on contract offers and 
trading frequency in such a “hostile” environment. For this reason Fehr and Zehnder (2008) 
conducted a credit market experiment which implements both features mentioned above. Two 
sources of moral hazard coexist in their credit market. First, the lender cannot observe the 
borrower’s project choice and, therefore, borrowers may choose inefficient high risk projects. 
Second, the absence of legal enforcement of repayments implies that borrowers may withhold 
their repayment even if they successfully realized their projects.  
The experimental credit market consists of 17 participants. Seven participants are 
lenders, the other ten are borrowers. Each borrower can realize one of two projects in each of 
the 20 periods: an efficient low-risk project or an inefficient high-risk project. Borrowers have 
no equity and need external funding from a lender to realize a project. Lenders can make as 
many contract offers as they wish in a one-sided continuous posted-offer auction. While the 
loan size is exogenously fixed, a contract offer determines the desired project and a desired 
repayment in case of project success. Contract offers can be public (every borrower can 
accept) or private (only a specific borrower can accept). Each lender and each borrower can 
conclude a maximum of one contract per period. Borrowers who have obtained credit can 
realize either the inefficient high risk project or the efficient low risk project; a random device 
determines whether the project is a success or a failure. Both the project choice and the 
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realized project return are private information to the borrower. In case of a project failure, the 
project’s return is zero and the borrower cannot make a repayment. If the project turns out to 
be successful, the borrower is able the make a repayment up to the level of the project return.  
In the main treatment of Fehr and Zehnder (2008), lenders and borrowers have fixed 
identification numbers, enabling lenders to establish long-term relationships with specific 
borrowers if they want to. Since this treatment is similar to the treatments with incomplete 
contracts and fixed identities in Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004, 2008) we also label it ICF. In 
the control treatment intentionally repeated interactions are excluded by randomly reassigning 
ID numbers at the beginning of every period – accordingly we call this treatment ICR. 
The more realistic setup with stochastic outcomes and asymmetric information makes 
reputation formation in the ICF treatment of this experiment much more difficult than in the 
experiments reported above. Since lenders can neither observe the project choice nor its 
outcome, they do not know whether a defaulting borrower is unable (because the project 
failed) or unwilling to repay his credit. Even an honest borrower who intends to repay and 
who chooses the efficient, low-risk project may face a project failure, making him unable to 
repay his debt. The lender can therefore never know with certainty whether he faced an 
opportunistic borrower who did not intend to repay his debt or whether the borrower had just 
bad luck. 
 
Figure 3 here 
 
The experimental results indicate that individual reputation formation in long-term relations is 
still a powerful contract enforcement device even if the informational conditions make 
acquiring a good reputation very difficult. The lack of repayment incentives leads to a 
breakdown of trading in the credit market in the ICR, where reputation formation 
opportunities are absent. Although a considerable fraction of reciprocal borrowers repay 
credits, trading is, on average, not profitable for lenders. Figure 3 shows the realized fraction 
of available contracts over time. While almost all lenders enter the credit market in the 
beginning, there is already a sharp decline in market trading in period 4 in the ICR. After 
period 4, trading gradually decreases until the frequency of market trading becomes very low. 
In the final period, only 17% of the feasible contracts are concluded. In contrast, a stable 
credit market emerges in the ICF where reputation formation is possible and borrowers can 
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acquire a reputation. Figure 3 indicates that at least 74 percent of the available trades take 
place in each of the first 19 periods. Overall, 81 percent of the available contracts are 
concluded. In this treatment, lenders establish long-term relations and condition future credit 
offers on the borrower’s current repayment behaviour so that the borrowers face incentives to 
choose the efficient low-risk project and to repay their debt. As in Brown, Falk and Fehr 
(2004), this leads to a bilateralisation of the market: the majority of trades are concluded by 
pairs who interact at least five times with each other. Thus, reputation formation in 
endogenously formed long-term credit relations strongly alleviates the double moral hazard 
problem in the credit market and allows for mutually beneficial trades between lenders and 
borrowers. 
 
3. The Impact of Reputational Incentives on Price Rigidity 
A considerable body of evidence indicates that prices in goods markets (Blinder 1991; 
Cechetti 1986; Carlton 1986), credit markets (Hannan and Berger 1991; Neumark and Sharpe 
1992), and particularly in labour markets are rigid (Blinder and Choi 1990; Akerlof, Dickens 
and Perry 1996; Altonji and Devereux 2000; Smith 2000; Nickell and Quintini 2003; Fehr and 
Goette 2005, Dickens et al. 2007). While there are many different explanations for price and 
wage rigidity in the literature, such as risk aversion (Azariadis 1975), transaction costs 
(Mankiw 1985, Salop 1979), or imperfect information (Lucas 1972), reciprocity has been 
suggested as one important source of rigidity in markets characterized by moral hazard 
(Akerlof and Yellen 1990). The evidence from competitive gift exchange markets discussed 
in Section 1 confirms that subjects in the role of employees are typically paid substantially 
more than their reservation wages, implying that wage levels do not converge to competitive 
levels. In addition to the level rigidity of prices and wages identified in those papers, there is 
also another interesting type of rigidity. This second type of rigidity concerns the question of 
how wages and prices change if shocks to supply and demand occur. Brandts and Charness 
(2004) nicely show that such shocks exert little influence on prices in gift exchange markets. 
They did not implement a control treatment with legal contract enforcement, however. 
Therefore, they cannot identify the source of the observed price rigidity, that is, whether the 
enforcement of contracts through reciprocity causes the low response of prices to shocks. 
Does relational contracting, i.e. the provision of reputation incentives in bilateral 
repeated trades, strengthen or weaken wage and price rigidity? Repeated game models of 
labour markets (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, MacLeod and Malcolmson 1989 and 1998) show 
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that relational contracting may lead to the payment of non-competitive rents in bilateral 
relationships. However, these models of relational contracting exhibit multiple equilibria 
which makes it impossible to predict how high these rents will be. Thus theory cannot tell us 
whether rents paid in relationships will be higher or lower than those which would prevail if 
repeated interaction were not feasible, and reciprocity alone would drive contract 
enforcement. The multiplicity of equilibria also makes it impossible to predict how market 
interactions and prices respond to exogenous shocks because for any set of exogenous 
parameters there exist many different equilibria with different behaviours and prices.  
The data in Brown Falk and Fehr (2004, 2008) enable us to answer the above 
questions on the role of reputational incentives in price rigidity. Their data allows us to study 
prices when reputation and reciprocity affect market outcome (ICF treatment), and compare 
these to prices when reciprocity alone affects the outcome (ICR treatment) or when contracts 
are third-party enforced (C treatment). Moreover, we can study price variation across market 
conditions in each of these treatments by comparing prices under high-demand (10 principals 
and 7 agents) and low-demand (7 principals and 10 agents).  
As we showed above, mean performance levels differ strongly across these treatments. 
When we compare prices, and price rigidity, across treatments it is therefore important to 
account for different performance levels. What we are interested in, after all, is how much a 
principal must pay for a given (or expected) performance level. In the following we therefore 
compare prices paid for a given performance level.7 Figure 4 displays the mean prices paid for 
performance levels 6-10 in each treatment.8 
 
Figure 4 here 
 
The figure shows that prices respond strongly to supply and demand changes under third party 
enforcement (C treatments). At all performance levels prices are much higher in the high 
demand condition and at the most frequent performance level of 10 the price in the high 
                                                 
7 In the ICF and ICR treatments the principals were asked, after a contract was accepted, which effort level they 
expected from the agent. We replicated our analysis of price rigidity in Figure 4 and Table 1 controlling for this 
"expected" performance rather than actual performance and observed qualitatively identical results. This is not 
surprising because actual performance levels and expected performance levels are highly correlated.  
8 There are almost no observations at performance levels below 6 in the C treatment, making a reliable 
comparison with the other treatments at these performance levels impossible. In the ICR treatment there are 
sufficient observations at each effort level from 6 to 10 to allow a reliable comparison with the ICF and C 
treatments.  
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demand condition is more than 40 units higher than in the low demand condition. This large 
amount of price flexibility stands in sharp contrast to the ICR treatment, where only 
reciprocity can be used to enforce contracts. Prices are much less responsive to changes in 
supply and demand in the ICR, indicating a remarkable degree of price stickiness in this 
environment and corroborating the results in Brandts and Charness (2004). Moreover, almost 
all interactions are one-shot in the C treatments and all interactions are one-shot by design in 
the ICR treatment. Therefore, the difference between the C and the ICR treatment cannot be 
due to differences in the duration of interactions within pairs but must, instead, be due to the 
absence of third party enforcement and the resulting reliance on reciprocity as a contract 
enforcement device.  
How does the introduction of reputational incentives in an environment without third 
party enforcement and explicit incentives change the responsiveness of prices to shocks? 
Figure 4 shows that reputational incentives increase the flexibility of prices considerably 
compared to the near absence of flexibility in the ICR condition. The formal tests reported in 
column 1 of Table 1 also support this result. The OLS regression shows that the price 
difference between excess demand and excess supply is roughly 10 units lower in the ICR 
treatment than in the ICF treatment. However, Figure 4 and Table 1 also show that 
reputational incentives do not completely restore price flexibility because price differences 
between high and low demand condition are roughly 13 units larger in the C treatment than in 
the ICF treatment. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Why do reputational incentives alleviate price stickiness? Reputation incentives may 
weaken downward price rigidity because they partially disburden prices from their function of 
motivating agents. Generous fixed payments are the only way to induce (reciprocal) agents to 
provide non-minimal performance in a one-shot gift exchange environment. In a setting with 
repeated interactions, selfish (and reciprocal) agents are concerned about the consequences of 
their current behaviour for their future earnings. In this environment, it is possible to motivate 
the performance of selfish (and reciprocal) agents with less generous fixed payments. Figure 4 
informs us about how the downward rigidity of prices is influenced by reputation incentives. 
The prices in the C condition provide us with information about what prices the principals 
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have to pay under competitive conditions with third party enforcement of contracts. Thus, by 
comparing prices in the C condition with those in the ICF and the ICR conditions, we can 
compute the rents paid in the latter two conditions. The agents in the ICR earn a considerable 
rent when there is a low demand for them. They receive prices that are roughly 17 units 
higher in the ICR than in the C treatment – a difference that is highly significant according to 
column 2 in Table 1. Prices are lower at any given performance level in the ICF treatment 
than in the ICR treatment. However, this price difference is small and insignificant (see ICR 
coefficient in column 2 of Table 1).  
Reputation incentives may also affect upward price rigidity in markets characterized by 
moral hazard problems. If principals in a one-shot situation expect that only some agents 
behave reciprocally, the expected performance of agents is lower for any price offer compared 
to a situation in which contracts are enforceable. Therefore, the principals in the ICR will 
offer lower prices for any desired effort level compared to principals in the C treatment, i.e., 
the lower performance expectation in the ICR constrains the impact of competition for agents 
on agents’ wages. In the ICF reputation incentives increase the expected performance relative 
to the ICR, and thus allow principals to compete more vigorously for agents by offering 
higher prices. However, as reputation incentives do not lead to perfect contract enforcement, 
the expected performance in the ICF is still lower than in the C treatment for any desired 
performance level. As a consequence, firms in the ICF are less willing to bid up prices in the 
high demand condition, implying a certain amount of upwards price rigidity relative to the C 
treatment. Figure 4 and column 3 of Table 1 document the upwards rigidity of prices in the 
high demand condition: In the ICF and ICR conditions wages are significantly lower than in 
C condition. In addition, prices in the ICF are significantly higher than in the ICR for each 
effort level.  
Comparing the first three columns of Table 1 there seems to be an interesting 
asymmetry in the effect of reputational incentives on price rigidity: In the high demand 
condition prices in the ICF are substantially and significantly higher than in the ICR while in 
the low demand condition prices in the ICF are almost identical to those in the ICR. Indeed, 
the coefficients of ICR in these columns suggest that the lower price responsiveness across 
demand conditions in the ICR compared to the ICF (9.7 points, see column 1) is mainly 
driven by a reduced upward price rigidity in the high demand condition of the ICF (8.4 points, 
see column 3). This finding is confirmed in a pooled analysis of all six treatments reported in 
the final column of the table. In this regression, the ICF condition of the low demand 
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condition is the omitted category. Therefore, the ICR term captures the difference in prices 
between the ICR and ICF treatments for the low demand condition, which is identical to the 
corresponding coefficient in regression (2). As this coefficient is close to zero and 
insignificant we can conclude that the ICF does not alleviate downwards wage rigidity in the 
low demand condition. The coefficient for High demand measures the price increase in the 
ICF treatment relative to the low demand condition. The negative interaction term ICR* High 
demand indicates that the impact of the high demand condition (relative to the low demand 
condition) is significantly lower in the ICR relative to the ICF condition, i.e., the high demand 
condition raises prices considerably less in the ICR. This result suggests that the increased 
responsiveness of prices to demand shocks in the ICF (relative to the ICR) is mainly due to 
the higher average performance under reputational incentives which enables the principals to 
compete more strongly for scarce agents by offering them higher wages. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
We examined the impact of reputational incentives on contract enforcement, the terms of 
trade and trading patterns in competitive markets with moral hazard. The evidence indicates 
that reputation formation strongly amplifies the positive effect of reciprocity on contract 
efficiency. The opportunity for reputation formation gives selfish agents an incentive to 
mimic the reciprocal agents’ behaviour in order to improve the future contract offers they may 
receive from principals. As a consequence, reputation effects can be sufficiently strong to 
sustain high levels of efficiency, even when reciprocal behaviour alone cannot prevent a 
collapse of market trading. While reputation formation does enhance efficiency, it also 
fundamentally alters the nature of market interaction. Long-term trading in bilateral pairs 
replaces one-shot interactions when third party enforcement of contracts is absent and 
reputation is a key force of enforcing contracts. In fact, bilateral relations play an important 
role in our experimental markets even if a public reputation can be acquired.  
Interestingly, we find that the bilateralisation of the market through relational 
contracting increases the responsiveness of prices to changes in supply and demand. We are 
able to identify the absence of third party enforcement and the subsequent reliance on 
reciprocity as an enforcement device as the key force behind the unresponsiveness of prices to 
shocks. Relational contracting increases price flexibility by rendering the principals more 
willing to compete for scarce agents, that is, by alleviation upwards price rigidity. In addition, 
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it also alleviates downwards price rigidity somewhat but this effect is small and not 
significant.  
Our findings are a first step in understanding the relevance of relational contracts for 
price formation in labour, goods and credit markets. Future studies should disentangle the 
impact of contract enforcement problems on price rigidity from the role of alternative causes 
such as transaction costs, insurance considerations, imperfect information or imperfect 
competition. Moreover, field studies should examine whether the observed impact of moral 
hazard on wage rigidity in the labour market, is comparable to its impact on prices in goods 
markets and interest rates in credit markets. Understanding whether the rigidity of prices and 
interest rates are driven by imperfect competition or transaction costs, or are the result of 
inherent contract enforcement problems is not only of academic interest, but also of key 
importance to policy makers in central banks and to competition authorities.  
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Table 1. Determinants of Price Rigidity 
 
  
Price difference 
between low & high 
demand condition 
Price in low demand 
condition 
Price in high 
demand condition 
Price in high and 
low demand 
condition 
     
Effort -1.522 4.554 2.407 4.554 
 [0.649]** [0.205]*** [0.328]*** [0.201]*** 
     
C treatment 13.368 -17.895 11.341 -17.895 
 [4.547]*** [1.906]*** [2.495]*** [1.870]*** 
     
ICR treatment -9.717 0.412 -8.423 0.412 
 [4.031]** [1.428] [2.656]*** [1.400] 
     
High demand     29.453 
    [3.168]*** 
     
Effort * High demand    -2.147 
    [0.380]*** 
     
C * High demand    29.235 
    [3.085]*** 
     
ICR * High demand    -8.835 
    [2.964]*** 
     
Constant 26.553 8.681 38.134 8.681 
  [4.567]*** [1.449]*** [2.878]*** [1.422]*** 
Observations 27 1459 1561 3020 
R-squared 0.54 0.61 0.64 0.74 
Clustered at session 
level no yes yes yes 
Note: Column (1) shows an OLS regression of price differences between the low- and high-demand 
conditions across the ICR, the ICF and the C treatment. The dependent variable is the mean price difference 
between the high-demand and low-demand conditions per effort level and treatment. Columns (2) and (3) 
show OLS regressions of prices in individual contracts on the C and the ICR treatments, with the ICF 
treatment as the omitted category. In the OLS regressions of column (4) individual prices in both the high 
and the low demand condition are the dependent variable and the ICF treatment in the low demand 
condition is the omitted category. Robust standard errors are in brackets in all regressions. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level.  
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Figure 1. Endogenous Reputation Formation in Markets 
 
A. Reputation and Average Contract Efficiency over Time 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
M
ea
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
complete contracts treatment (C)
incomplete contracts treatment with fixed identities (ICF)
incomplete contracts treatment with random identities (ICR)
 
Note: In the ICF treatment, contracts are not third party enforceable and long-term 
relations (reputation building) are possible. Contracts in the ICR treatment are not 
third party enforceable, and long-term relations are ruled out. Contracts are third 
party enforceable and long-term relations are possible in the C treatment.  
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C. Cumulative Share of Trades in Relationships of Various Lengths  
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Note: In the ICF treatment, contracts are not third party enforceable and long-term 
relations (bilateral reputation) are possible. Contracts in the C treatment are third party 
enforceable and long-term relations (bilateral reputation) are possible. In the modified 
ICF treatment contracts are not third party enforceable and long-term relations as well as 
public reputation building is possible.  
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Figure 2. Reputation and Reciprocity Effects on Performance under Excess 
Demand and Supply 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Period
M
ea
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
incomplete contracts treatment with 
random identities (ICR) - low demand
incomplete contracts treatment with 
random identities (ICR) - high demand
incomplete contracts treatment with 
fixed identities (ICF) - high demand
incomplete contracts treatment with 
fixed identities (ICF) - low demand
 
  
Note: “low demand” indicates excess supply of agents. “high demand” indicates excess demand for 
agents. Only reciprocity can enforce contracts in the ICR treatments. Both reciprocity and reputational 
incentives, as well as their interaction, can enforce contracts in the ICF treatments.  
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Figure 3. Relational Contracts when Reciprocity fails 
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Note: Long-term relations between lenders and borrowers are possible in the ICF treatment, while 
long-term relations are ruled out in the ICR treatment. In both treatments, a lender faces the same two 
moral hazard problems: choice of inefficient high risk projects and lack of credit repayment in case of 
project success.  
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Figure 4. The Impact of Reciprocity and Reputation on Price Rigidity 
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Note: “low demand” indicates excess supply of agents. “high demand” indicates excess demand for 
agents. Neither reciprocity nor reputation is needed for contract enforcement in the C treatments. In the 
ICR treatments, only reciprocity can enforce contracts. Both reciprocity and reputational incentives, as 
well as their interaction, can enforce contracts in the ICF treatments.  
 
 
